Data source mapping for ATT&CK v20.0 detections
Map log sources such as Sysmon, EDR telemetry, Windows Event Logs, and cloud audit logs to detectable ATT&CK v20.0 techniques using matrix filters and Detections tab telemetry.
Why map data sources to techniques?
Detection engineering starts with a simple question: given the logs we actually collect, which ATT&CK v20.0 techniques can we detect today—and which ones are blind spots?
MITRE maps defensive telemetry to detection strategies through log source names (for example WinEventLog:Sysmon), channels, and data components. ATT&CK Intelligence View surfaces those mappings in the Detections tab and lets you filter the matrix by data source so you can plan coverage with your real sensor stack—not an idealized one.
How the app maps telemetry
Each detection strategy in ATT&CK v20.0 can reference analytics (AN####) with mapped telemetry rows: platform, log source, channel, and data component.
The header Data Source filter narrows the matrix to techniques whose mapped detections reference at least one of the log sources you select. Combine it with Platform, Data Component, or Tactic filters to scope engineering sprints, hunt plans, or logging gap reviews.
- Data source = the log provider MITRE names in defensive mappings (e.g. WinEventLog:Sysmon, AWS:CloudTrail, auditd:SYSCALL).
- Data component = the event or artifact type within that source (e.g. process creation, file modification, network traffic).
- Empty telemetry on a technique means ATT&CK v20.0 may document the behavior but not yet map log sources for it—a coverage gap to track, not a dead end.
Recommended mapping workflow
- Inventory what you collect — List log sources your SIEM, EDR, cloud platform, and network sensors actually ingest—Sysmon, Windows Security, EDR alerts, CloudTrail, VPC flow logs, DNS, proxy, auditd, and so on.
- Filter the matrix by data source — In the header, select one or more data sources (hold Ctrl/Cmd for multi-select). Use Filtered only mode to see only techniques detectable with those logs, or highlight mode to compare against the full matrix.
- Validate per technique — Open priority techniques → Detections tab. Confirm platform, log source, channel, and data component rows match what your pipeline parses. Note gaps where MITRE maps a source you do not ingest.
- Cross-check tactics — Add a Tactic filter to focus on Execution, Persistence, Credential Access, or other categories relevant to your assessment. Export Excel (Telemetry sheet) for architecture or detection backlog reviews.
- Feed logging and rule work — Techniques with no mapped telemetry for your sources become logging projects. Techniques with telemetry you ingest but no rules become detection engineering backlog items—see the Detection Engineering guide.
Example — Windows endpoint stack — You ingest WinEventLog:Sysmon and EDR process telemetry on Windows endpoints. Filter Platform = Windows and Data Source = WinEventLog:Sysmon. The matrix shows techniques MITRE maps to Sysmon-backed detections. Open T1059.001 and read Detections for CommandLinePattern and ParentProcessName parameters plus mapped channels. Repeat with your EDR-normalized source names where they appear in mappings.
Common data sources and tactic coverage
Reference table for planning—not every technique in a tactic will be detectable from every source. Use the matrix filter and Detections tab to confirm specific TIDs.
The tactic categories below describe where each log source is typically strongest for detection engineering and threat hunting. Coverage varies by technique, sub-technique, and environment.
| Data source | Typical platform | Technique categories (tactics) covered |
|---|---|---|
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | Windows | Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion, Credential Access, Lateral Movement, Command and Control |
| WinEventLog:Security | Windows | Credential Access, Lateral Movement, Privilege Escalation, Persistence, Discovery |
| Windows Event Log (PowerShell / Script Block Logging) | Windows | Execution, Defense Evasion, Collection |
| EDR telemetry (process, file, network events) | Windows, macOS, Linux | Execution, Persistence, Defense Evasion, Credential Access, Discovery, Lateral Movement, Command and Control |
| ETW / Windows diagnostic channels | Windows | Execution, Defense Evasion, Persistence, Discovery |
| auditd (SYSCALL, EXECVE, etc.) | Linux | Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion, Discovery |
| journald / Linux syslog | Linux | Execution, Persistence, Discovery, Defense Evasion |
| macOS unified logs | macOS | Execution, Persistence, Credential Access, Defense Evasion |
| AWS:CloudTrail | Cloud (IaaS) | Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion, Discovery, Exfiltration |
| Azure Activity Log / Azure AD sign-in | Cloud, Identity | Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Credential Access |
| M365 / Microsoft 365 Defender | SaaS, Identity | Initial Access, Collection, Exfiltration, Command and Control |
| VPC Flow Logs / NSG flow logs | Cloud, Network | Command and Control, Exfiltration, Lateral Movement, Discovery |
| DNS logs (resolver, passive DNS) | Network | Command and Control, Exfiltration, Discovery |
| Proxy / web gateway logs | Network | Command and Control, Exfiltration, Initial Access |
| Kubernetes audit / container runtime logs | Containers | Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Discovery |
Pair data sources with data components
Log sources tell you where events come from; data components tell you what happened (process creation, file modification, network connection, user account authentication).
After filtering by data source, add a Data Component filter—or read both columns in the Detections tab—to avoid over-assuming coverage. Sysmon may support process and network detections, but not every Execution or Command and Control technique maps to both.
| Data component (examples) | Often paired sources | Typical tactic focus |
|---|---|---|
| Process creation / command execution | Sysmon, EDR, auditd | Execution, Persistence, Defense Evasion |
| File creation / modification | Sysmon, EDR, Linux audit | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Collection |
| Network connection / traffic | Sysmon, EDR, VPC flow, NSM | Command and Control, Exfiltration, Lateral Movement |
| Authentication / logon events | Windows Security, Azure AD, Okta | Initial Access, Credential Access, Lateral Movement |
| Cloud API / management events | CloudTrail, Azure Activity Log | Initial Access, Persistence, Defense Evasion |
Common pitfalls
- Assuming one log source covers an entire tactic. Tactics span many behaviors; validate technique-by-technique in the Detections tab.
- Ignoring sub-techniques. Parent T1059 and sub-technique T1059.001 may map to different telemetry rows.
- Treating EDR as a single MITRE data source name. Vendor feeds may normalize to several log source labels in ATT&CK v20.0—search the Data Source filter for all names your stack matches.
- Skipping techniques with empty telemetry. Document them as logging gaps rather than dropping them from your assessment.
- Mapping without platform context. CloudTrail techniques differ from Sysmon techniques—always pair Data Source with Platform filters.
Related guides
Continue with Detection Engineering for the full DET → AN → parameter workflow, Threat Hunting for hypothesis-driven use of data source filters, and Matrix & Filters for filter modes and the filter logic bar.